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Is the Prohibition of Homicide Universal? 
EVIDENCE FROM COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
John Mikhail† 
Is morality universal, and should the law care? The topic 
of this Symposium could be addressed from many vantage 
points. In this Essay, I sketch one approach that seems to me 
both interesting and fruitful, while nonetheless recognizing that 
it is merely one among many possible avenues to explore in this 
rich vein. 
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Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory; MIT Department of Brain and Cognitive 
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advice, criticisms, and encouragement. Much of the data described herein was collected 
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Whether moral universals exist is one of history’s most 
widely debated topics. Virtually everyone has an opinion about 
it, and much ink has been spilled over the matter. Among 
serious researchers, one might expect that broad and vaguely 
defined questions like this would give way to more narrowly 
focused inquiries; for example, whether any specific acts, such as 
murder, are universally prohibited, and if so whether the 
content of these prohibitions is largely uniform across cultures 
or varies significantly among different societies. This way of 
framing the inquiry shifts the focus, at least initially, from 
morality to law, on the assumption that the law frequently “is 
the witness and external deposit of our moral life”1 and that at 
least some crimes and other legal prohibitions rest on 
“immemorial ideas of right and wrong.”2 Their legal pedigree 
may depend on official recognition or positive enactment, but 
their ultimate source is rooted in customary morality or 
customary law. This formulation also substitutes a tractable 
empirical question for a potentially interminable philosophical 
debate. Presumably there is an answer to the question of how 
uniform or widespread certain legal prohibitions are, for which a 
range of compelling evidence can be brought to bear. It seems 
reasonable to assume, therefore, that one might make some 
progress on the question presented by examining the various 
penal codes that exist throughout the world and determining the 
precise extent to which they overlap with respect to particular 
acts, such as murder or other forms of homicide. 
Surprisingly, hardly any systematic research has been 
done to examine this question. The leading social scientific 
studies of homicide, such as Martin Daly and Margo Wilson’s 
Homicide3 or Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner’s Violence and 
Crime in Cross-National Perspective,4 contain many valuable 
insights, but they do not squarely address the existence of 
substantive moral or legal universals or their codification in 
positive law. Daly and Wilson’s study is mainly concerned with 
the behavioral profile and evolutionary psychology of homicide, 
of who kills and why, while Archer and Gartner’s book is focused 
primarily on homicide rates, that is, on recorded patterns of 
homicide and other violent crimes in different cultural contexts. 
  
 1 O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
 2 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 292 (2nd ed. 1961). 
 3 MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE (1988). 
 4 DANE ARCHER & ROSEMARY GARTNER, VIOLENCE AND CRIME IN CROSS-
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1984). 
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Neither volume seeks to describe a shared blueprint for 
considered judgments about homicide or their basis in human 
moral cognition. Although anthropologists, cognitive scientists, 
and other researchers have occasionally undertaken to study in 
general terms the role of intent, causation, and other elements of 
blame and responsibility in different cultural contexts, the 
ethnographic record is likewise largely devoid of the kind of 
detailed analysis of mens rea, actus reus, and available defenses 
or their civil law counterparts that might uncover the precise 
structure of a universal prohibition against homicide or its basis 
in human cognitive capacities.5 As a result, even answers to 
relatively simple questions, such as whether every known 
society utilizes an intent requirement or recognizes some kind of 
insanity, necessity, or mistake of fact defense, remain elusive 
and unavailable. 
For their part, legal scholars have also generally failed to 
investigate the potential global reach of a specific, structured 
homicide prohibition. At least two major factors appear 
responsible for this puzzling state of affairs. First, as a general 
matter, comparative criminal law is a relatively neglected and 
underdeveloped discipline; those studies that do exist are mainly 
concerned with procedural rather than substantive law.6 Second, 
legal reform rather than accurate description has often been at 
the heart of comparative research.7 To take a typical example, 
Professor Stanley Yeo recently compared the mens rea elements 
for murder under the Canadian and Indian codes with those 
proposed by an Australian law reform body.8 He found the 
existing Canadian code deficient in multiple respects and 
proposed a number of specific improvements, including removing 
two superfluous phrases and adding a fault element based on 
  
 5 See, e.g., E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY IN 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS 286 (Atheneum 1968) (1954) (concluding without further 
elaboration that specific forms of justified and unjustified killing are universal); Margaret 
Mead, Some Anthropological Considerations Concerning Natural Law, 6 NAT. LAW F. 51, 
52 (1961) (same); see also DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS 138 (1991); MAX 
GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 204-41 (1965); Clyde Kluckhohn, 
Common Humanity and Diverse Cultures, in THE HUMAN MEANING OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 245 (Daniel Lerner ed., 1959); Frederic Maitland, The Early History of Malice 
Aforethought, 8 L. MAG. & REV. 406 (1883), reprinted in 1 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF 
FREDERIC MAITLAND 304 (1911).  
 6 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Comparative Criminal Law, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1308-09 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmerman 
eds., 2006).  
 7 Id. at 1302-05. 
 8 Stanley Yeo, “Murder” She Said: Canadian, Indian and Australian 
Formulations of the Fault Elements for Murder, 49 U.N.B.L.J. 21 (2000). 
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recklessness alone.9 Another representative study by Professor 
Alison Young analyzes the legal defenses available to battered 
women who kill their abusers in England and in Canada, 
advocating the reform of English law in light of recent 
developments in the Canadian Supreme Court.10 Likewise, two 
academics in New Zealand recently examined the jurisprudence 
of New Zealand and South Africa with regard to the lawfulness 
of homicide committed while effecting arrests.11 The authors 
explain that their primary objective is to reduce the number of 
homicides occurring in the course of making an arrest.12 
Although isolated and narrowly circumscribed doctrinal articles 
like these possess considerable practical value, they fail to speak 
directly to the broader scientific question at issue. 
More comprehensive studies in comparative criminal law 
also tend to have a practical and reform-minded orientation. The 
monumental sixteen-volume “Comparative Depiction of German 
and Foreign Criminal Law” published under the direction of the 
German Justice Ministry from 1905 to 1909, for instance, was 
designed in connection with the reform of the German criminal 
code.13 Although it contains a great deal of relevant information, 
it is not conceived or organized in a manner that is particularly 
useful to those researchers in anthropology, cognitive science, 
experimental philosophy, or related fields who might seek to 
identify moral universals or to elaborate modern conceptions of 
universal jurisprudence. Other large-scale projects follow the 
same pattern. For example, Homicide Law in Comparative 
Perspective,14 an informative volume edited by Professor Jeremy 
Holder, consists of a collection of essays arising out of reform 
proposals of the Law Commission for England and Wales. Each 
contributor analyzes the law of homicide in his or her respective 
jurisdiction. Although the precise structure of the homicide 
prohibition and its various fault elements are given serious 
attention, the dominant orientation remains legislative reform. 
  
 9 Id. at 32. 
 10 Alison Young, Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative 
Analysis, 31 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 761 (1993). 
 11 Michael Spisto & Fran Wright, (Justifiable) Homicide Whilst Effecting an 
Arrest: When is this Lawful? A Comparison between the South African and New Zealand 
Systems of Law, 7 WAIKATO L. REV. 147 (1999). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See generally VERGLEICHENDE DARSTELLUNG DES DEUTSCHEN UND 
AUSLÄNDISCHEN STRAFRECHTS: VORARBEITEN ZUE DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTREFORM 
(1905-1909), cited and discussed by Dubber, supra note 6, at 1303.  
 14 HOMICIDE LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Jeremy Holder ed., 2007). 
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Further, only nine jurisdictions are represented. Needless to say, 
while this type of comparative research can be suggestive, it is 
an insufficient basis on which to ground controversial claims 
about human universals or cause the broader scientific 
community to sit up and take notice. 
The foregoing review highlights another limitation of the 
existing literature on comparative criminal law: it is often 
restricted to nations or cultures that fall within a particular 
geographic region or share a common legal history, in particular 
that of European colonialism. The comparative enterprise 
spawned by the spread of English common law is probably the 
most familiar modern example of this phenomenon, but the 
same holds true of French, German, and other influential 
systems of law.15 In these colonial and post-colonial settings, 
comparative scholars have typically examined isolated topics of 
interest, such as the law of reckless homicide or the variable role 
of provocation as a mitigating plea to homicide in 
Commonwealth countries.16 Once again a sound basis for 
significant generalizations that might cut broadly across 
cultural, geographic, or historical boundaries appears to be 
lacking. 
To be sure, a few scattered studies exist that have 
extended our intellectual horizons somewhat beyond the 
relatively narrow constraints that characterize most 
comparative research. In 1912, Professor D. Oswald Dykes 
surveyed the homicide classifications of several unrelated 
jurisdictions, including England, Scotland, continental Europe, 
the United States, and India.17 Another early article by Professor 
Charles Lobinger examined the law of homicide in England, 
France, Spain, Germany, Japan, and China.18 More recently, 
Professor Igor Andrejew’s analysis of criminal law in socialist 
  
 15 German scholars, for instance, were among the founders of legal 
anthropology, and they developed a keen interest in customary tribal law in Africa and 
elsewhere. See, e.g., Andrew Lyall, Early German Legal Anthropology: Albert Hermann 
Post and His Questionnaire, 52 J. AFRICAN LAW 114 (2008). The classic illustration of 
common legal origins, of course, is the Roman law foundation of virtually all Western and 
many non-Western legal systems. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: 
THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983); ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW (1991). 
 16 See, e.g., M. Sornarajah, Commonwealth Innovations on the Law of 
Provocation, 24 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 184 (1975); M. Sornarajah, Reckless Murder in 
Commonwealth Law, 24 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 846 (1975). 
 17 D. Oswald Dykes, Classifications of Homicide—A Study in Comparative Law, 
24 JURID. REV. 184 (1912-1913). 
 18 Charles Sumner Lobingier, The Homicide Concept—A Study in Comparative 
Criminal Law, 9 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (1918-1919). 
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countries utilized common political and economic structures as 
criteria for analyzing penal systems not only in former Eastern 
Bloc countries, but also in Mongolia, North Korea, China, and 
North Vietnam.19  
In addition, the federalist system of the United States 
has long afforded an opportunity for sustained comparative 
analysis, albeit of a domestic and highly integrated variety. For 
example, the nineteenth century witnessed the publication of a 
number of useful treatises in the United States dedicated to the 
law of homicide, and these volumes often included a significant 
comparative dimension.20 Likewise, the American Law 
Institute’s Model Penal Code is, in effect, a substantial 
comparative project that seeks to organize and reform the body 
of common and statutory law that has accumulated over several 
centuries in both state and federal jurisdictions.21 This massive 
effort has had a major influence on legal education throughout 
the English-speaking world and beyond, and it has inspired 
similar projects in Latin America and elsewhere.22 Finally, in 
recent years leading criminal law theorists such as Markus 
Dubber,23 George Fletcher,24 Stuart Green,25 and other scholars 
have begun to call for a more sustained engagement with 
foreign, international, and transnational materials, and many of 
them have made significant contributions toward that end.26 
From a scientific perspective, however, even these more 
ambitious scholarly endeavors comprise relatively limited and 
  
 19 IGOR ANDREJEW, DROIT PÈNAL COMPARÉ DES PAYS SOCIALISTS, (Maciej 
Szepietowski, trans.) (1981). 
 20 See, e.g., FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HOMICIDE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Philadelphia, Kaye & Brother, 1855); THE MICHIE CO., A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF HOMICIDE (1914); JAMES M. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 
(New York & Albany, Banks & Brothers, 1891). 
 21 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE. 
 22 JUAN BUSTOS RAMIREZ & MANUEL VALENZUELA BEJAS, LE SYSTÈME PENAL 
DES PAYS DE L’AMERIQUE LATINE 7 (Jacqueline Bernat de Celis trans., 1983). 
 23 See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 6; see also MARKUS DUBBER & MARK KELMAN, 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, COMMENTS (2005); Markus D. Dubber, 
Criminal Law in Comparative Context, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433 (2006). 
 24 See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, 1 THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, 
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL: FOUNDATIONS (2007) [hereinafter FLETCHER, THE 
GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW]; GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 
(1998) [hereinafter FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW]. 
 25 See, e.g., Stuart Green, The Universal Grammar of Criminal Law, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 2104 (1998) (reviewing FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 
24). 
 26 For one notably impressive effort in this direction, see DAVID LUBAN, JULIE 
R. O’SULLIVAN & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
(2010). 
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piecemeal investigations, particularly when measured against 
analogous fields like comparative linguistics. Significantly, none 
of these efforts have been so bold as to hypothesize and then 
systematically investigate the possible universal structure of the 
homicide prohibition, let alone its potential reflection of innate 
moral capacities. 
These preliminary remarks supply a useful framework 
for introducing the novel research project in cognitive science 
and comparative criminal law summarized in the remainder of 
this Essay. Drawing on several years of intensive work, my 
research assistants and I have begun to fill a major gap in the 
literature and thereby help to advance our theoretical 
understanding of moral and legal universals—and, ultimately, of 
the evolutionary, neurocognitive, and cultural processes that 
generate and support them—by examining how the prohibition 
of homicide is codified in several hundred jurisdictions 
throughout the world, including all of the 204 member-states of 
the United Nations and the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court.27 Among other objectives, our study seeks to 
identify the proportion of jurisdictions that criminalizes one or 
more forms of homicide and that includes a mental state 
element in their definition of criminal homicide. The study also 
seeks to examine the prevalence and substance of specific 
justifications and excuses, including eight of the most prominent 
legal defenses: (1) self-defense, (2) necessity, (3) insanity or 
mental illness, (4) duress or compulsion, (5) provocation, (6) 
intoxication, (7) mistake of fact, and (8) mistake of law. 
Although this research program is still unfolding, the 
main provisional finding thus far is that the prohibition of 
homicide does appear to be both universal and highly invariant, 
at least within the parameters of our investigation, which is 
restricted to codified law and excludes other sources of legal 
norms, such as custom or case law, and which is aimed primarily 
at uncovering broad generalizations related to the foregoing 
categories, rather than identifying other, more specific 
differences. In particular, all of the jurisdictions investigated 
thus far do appear to criminalize one or more forms of homicide. 
In addition, all of these jurisdictions do appear to include a 
  
 27 The project was conceived over ten years ago in connection with some 
comparative research on the law of homicide that I undertook in law school and later 
published in the Stanford Law Review. See generally John Mikhail, Law, Science and 
Morality: A Review of Richard Posner’s ‘The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory’, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1057, 1098-1110 (2002). 
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mental state element in their definitions of unlawful homicide. 
That is, none of the jurisdictions investigated thus far adopt a 
purely strict liability approach to unlawful homicide. 
In addition, the particular justifications and excuses 
identified thus far in our research are remarkably similar and 
appear to consist of a relatively short list of familiar categories, 
including the eight main defenses enumerated above. Among 
other things, this suggests that the specific circumstances in 
which intentional killing is held to be justified or excused may be 
far more constrained than many commentators have implied.28 
On the other hand, there does appear to be significant diversity 
with respect to some of these defenses, at least at the level of 
codified law. Specifically, although some of the most common 
defenses, such as self-defense and insanity/mental illness, 
appear to be universal or nearly so, other categories, such as 
necessity, duress and provocation, appear somewhat less 
prevalent. 
The main provisional results of the study are exhibited in 
Table 1, which supplies a representative sample of 41 of the 205 
jurisdictions (i.e., 20%) included thus far in our research. As 
Table 1 implies, the methods employed in our investigation were 
relatively simple and straightforward. An alphabetical list of 
countries was compiled and the relevant provisions of each 
jurisdiction’s penal code were located using a variety of sources, 
including collections such as The American Series of Foreign 
Penal Codes,29 websites such as that of the Buffalo Criminal Law 
Center,30 and other available print and web resources. Each set 
of provisions was copied or transcribed into a single master 
document, which eventually ran to over one thousand pages.31 
Whenever possible, official English translations of non-English 
codes were utilized. In the case of those countries for which no 
English translation was available, researchers copied or 
transcribed the relevant code provisions in the available 
  
 28 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL 
THEORY 121 (1999); Chandra Sekhar Sripada, Nativism and Moral Psychology: Three 
Models of the Innate Structure that Shapes the Contents of Moral Norms, in 1 MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY: THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS 319-44 (W. 
Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). 
 29 See generally 1-29 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (1960-1987). 
 30 Buffalo Criminal Law Center, http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/ (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2010). 
 31 See John Mikhail, Homicide: A Universal Prohibition (tentative title) (March 
8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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language and then translators supplied provisional English 
translations. 
Using the criteria listed below, researchers then analyzed 
the code provisions, seeking to determine whether each of the 
following seven categories was satisfied by a given jurisdiction. 
As an initial matter, we limited our attention to whether a given 
jurisdiction criminalizes homicide, whether its definition of 
homicide includes a mental state element, and whether it 
recognizes the defenses of self-defense, insanity/mental illness, 
necessity, duress, and provocation. Intoxication, mistake of fact, 
and mistake of law are therefore not included in the following 
analysis. All of the seven categories that were utilized in the 
study are, of course, open to multiple interpretations, but three 
of them especially so: necessity, duress, and whether the given 
jurisdiction includes a mental state requirement in its definition 
of homicide. As a rough first cut, therefore, a decision was made 
to analyze these three categories using two sets of criteria, one 
more restrictive and the other more inclusive. Both sets of 
criteria are given below.  
1. Criminal Homicide 
Criteria: Do the available codified laws of the jurisdiction 
make the killing of a human being a crime?  
Results: 41/41 (100%) of tabulated jurisdictions 
criminalize homicide. 
2. Mental Element to Homicide  
First Set of Criteria (more restrictive): Do the available 
codified laws of the jurisdiction incorporate the mental state of 
the offender (e.g., intent, malice, etc.) into its definition of 
murder or other forms of criminal homicide? Codes which 
include a separate offense of “unintentional” or “negligent” 
homicide, or similar offenses, are included by negative 
implication. In addition, codes which limit criminal liability to 
acts committed with intent in a general part or other general 
section of the code, unless otherwise specified by law, are also 
included. 
Results: 38/41 (93%) of tabulated jurisdictions include a 
mental element in their definition of criminal homicide. 
Second Set of Criteria (more inclusive): All of the 
jurisdictions included under the first set of criteria, plus 
jurisdictions that supply a mental element requirement 
506 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:2 
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indirectly, for example, by means of a general mistake of fact 
provision that exempts an offender from criminal liability, or 
jurisdictions for which a mental element is otherwise implied. 
Jurisdictions that distinguish separate crimes for murder and 
manslaughter, without corresponding definitions, are also 
included. 
Results: 41/41 (100%) of tabulated jurisdictions include a 
mental element to homicide, including indirect or implied 
elements. 
3. Self-Defense (or Defense of Others)  
Criteria: Do the available codified laws of the jurisdiction 
allow for justification, excuse, or reduced punishment if the act 
was committed in defense of self or others? These criteria may 
be satisfied by provisions that identify self-defense or defense of 
others as a complete defense or by provisions that provide for 
mitigated punishment. Jurisdictions that explicitly state that 
self-defense or defense of others is a mitigating factor are 
included, even if the degree of mitigation is left to the 
discretionof the judge. Jurisdictions that provide blanket grants 
of discretion to the judge for generic or unspecified mitigating 
factors, however, are not included. Also excluded in this 
tabulation are provisions which more closely resemble 
provocation defenses, even though many of these provisions 
might be applicable in situations of self-defense as well. Codes 
with necessity-like defensive force provisions were evaluated on 
a case-by-case basis. 
Results: 38/41 (93%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the 
stated criteria for Self Defense (or Defense of Others). 
4. Insanity or Mental Illness  
Criteria: Do the available codified laws of the jurisdiction 
allow for justification, excuse, or reduced punishment based on 
the insanity, mental illness, or other mental incapacity of the 
offender? These criteria may be satisfied by provisions that 
identify insanity or mental illness as a complete defense or by 
provisions that mitigate punishment based on these 
characteristics or some analogous mental incapacity. Codes that 
explicitly state that insanity, mental illness, or other mental 
incapacity is a mitigating factor are included, even if the degree 
of mitigation is left to the discretion of the judge. Jurisdictions 
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that provide blanket grants of discretion to the judge for generic 
or unspecified mitigating factors, however, are not included. 
Results: 38/41 (93%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the 
stated criteria for Insanity / Mental Illness. 
5. Necessity 
First Set of Criteria (more restrictive): Do the available 
codified laws of the jurisdiction allow for justification, excuse, or 
reduced punishment if the act was committed in circumstances 
in which a defendant commits a crime or causes harm to a 
protected interest for the purpose or with the foreseeable effect 
of avoiding a greater crime, harm, or evil? Jurisdictions that 
provide for a similar defense defined in terms of reasonableness 
or under the heading of “choice of evils,” “emergency,” or “state 
of necessity,” without further elaboration, are included.  
Results: 25/41 (61%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the 
stated criteria for Necessity. 
Second Set of Criteria (more inclusive): All of the 
jurisdictions included under the first set of criteria, plus 
jurisdictions that refer to an “irresistible fear,” “threat of 
imminent death or serious harm,” force majeure, or similar 
concepts, as well as jurisdictions that include certain other 
provisions that more closely resemble duress defenses. 
Results: 33/41 (80%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the 
more inclusive criteria for Necessity, including provisions 
related to “irresistible force,” “threat of imminent harm,” force 
majeure, or similar concepts, or which more closely resemble 
duress defenses. 
6. Duress / Compulsion  
First Set of Criteria (more restrictive): Do the available 
codified laws of the jurisdiction allow for justification, excuse, or 
reduced punishment if the act was committed under duress, 
coercion, irresistible fear, or similar compulsory conditions? 
Although the actual operation of these provisions may be 
uncertain, jurisdictions that include such provisions are 
included, unless homicide is specifically exempted. 
Results: 32/41 (78%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the 
stated criteria for Duress / Compulsion. 
Second Set of Criteria (more inclusive): All of the 
jurisdictions included under the first set of criteria, plus 
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jurisdictions that refer to “an unavoidable threat,” “necessary 
evil,” or similar concepts, as well as jurisdictions that include 
certain other provisions that more closely resemble necessity 
defenses. 
Results: 34/41 (83%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the 
more inclusive criteria for Duress / Compulsion, including 
provisions related to “unavoidable threat,” “necessary evil,” or 
similar concepts, or which more closely resemble necessity 
defenses. 
7. Provocation 
Criteria: Do the available codified laws of the jurisdiction 
allow for justification, excuse or reduced punishment if the act 
was provoked by the victim? Jurisdictions that include 
provisions such as “heat of passion,” “under the influence of 
violent emotions,” or similar concepts are included. 
Results: 28/41 (68%) of tabulated jurisdictions meet the 
stated criteria for Provocation. 
The main provisional results for each of these seven 
categories are represented graphically in Figure 1. Stated in its 
strongest form, the picture that emerges from this research is 
that legal systems and therefore individuals throughout the 
world recognize that intentional killing without justification or 
excuse is prohibited, and that self-defense and insanity, and to a 
lesser extent necessity, duress, and provocation, can sometimes 
be potentially valid justifications or excuses. These are 
noteworthy generalizations that to the best of my knowledge go 
beyond anything comparable in the existing scientific or legal 
literature in uncovering or at least beginning to illuminate the 
properties of a specific universal or near-universal norm against 
homicide. They also directly challenge the conventional relativist 
assumption that although “[t]here are certain high-level themes 
that one sees in the contents of moral norms in virtually all 
human groups—themes such as harms, incest, helping and 
sharing, social justice, and group defense . . . the specific rules 
that fall under these themes exhibit enormous variability.”32 
  
 32 Sripada, supra note 28, at 330; cf. POSNER, supra note 28, at 6 (arguing that 
“what counts as murder . . . varies enormously from society to society”). 
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Figure 1: Universal Elements of the Homicide Prohibition (n = 41 jurisdictions) 
In addition, these findings imply that at least some 
technical legal definitions of prohibited acts and recognized 
defenses may indeed capture the structure of common moral 
intuitions.33 To this extent they lend support to the hypothesis 
that human beings are “intuitive lawyers” who possess tacit or 
implicit moral and legal knowledge and a natural ability to 
compute structurally complex unconscious representations of 
human acts and their components (the “moral grammar 
hypothesis” that commentators have begun to debate in recent 
years).34 For example, these findings reinforce and extend the 
  
 33 See John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the 
Future, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 143, 151 (2007). 
 34 See generally JOHN MIKHAIL, ELEMENTS OF MORAL COGNITION: RAWLS’ 
LINGUISTIC ANALOGY AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORAL AND LEGAL JUDGMENT 
(2010); John Mikhail, Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of 
Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND 
MOTIVATION, VOL. 50: MORAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING 27-100 (D. Bartels et al., 
eds., 2009); John Mikhail, “Plucking the Mask of Mystery from Its Face”: Jurisprudence 
and H.L.A. Hart, 95 GEO. L. J. 733 (2007); see also, e.g., KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, 
EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS (2008); MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: EMPATHY 
IN LAW AND PUNISHMENT (2006); MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE 
DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG (2006); RAY JACKENDOFF, 
LANGUAGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND CULTURE: ESSAYS ON MENTAL STRUCTURE (2009); 
JESSE PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS (2007); Monica Bucciarelli, 
Sangeet Khemlani, & P. N. Johnson-Laird, The Psychology of Moral Reasoning, 3 
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 121 (2008); Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob, 
Universal Moral Grammar: A Critical Appraisal, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 373 
(2007); Susan Dwyer, How Good is the Linguistic Analogy?, in THE INNATE MIND, VOL. 2: 
CULTURE AND COGNITION 237-56 (Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich, 
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discovery that three and four year-old children utilize what is, in 
effect, a mala in se/mala prohibita distinction when making 
moral judgments, distinguishing “genuine” or intrinsic moral 
violations (e.g., battery, theft) from violations of social 
conventions (e.g., wearing pajamas to school);35 that four and five 
year-olds utilize what is, in effect, a mistake of law/mistake of 
fact distinction in the same context, recognizing that false 
factual beliefs can often serve to exculpate, but false moral 
beliefs typically do not;36 that adults make moral judgments in 
conformity with central doctrines of torts and criminal law, 
relying in particular on three key principles that distill the 
essence of the legal prohibition of purposeful battery: “(a) Harm 
caused by action is worse than harm caused by omission, (b) 
harm intended as the means to a goal is worse than harm 
foreseen as the side effect of a goal, and (c) harm involving 
physical contact with the victim is worse than harm involving no 
physical contact”;37 and that specific brain regions, including the 
right temporoparietal junction, precuneus, and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, are selectively recruited during moral 
judgment tasks that require sensitivity to an agent’s intentions, 
such as cases of mistake, ignorance, impossible attempt, and 
double effect.38 
  
eds., 2006); Michael D. Guttentag, Is There a Law Instinct? 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 269 
(2009); Joshua Greene, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, in 
THE INNATE MIND, VOL. 1: STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS 338-52 (Peter Carruthers, Stephen 
Laurence & Stephen Stich, eds., 2005); Robin Bradley Kar, The Deep Structure of Law 
and Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 877 (2006); Matthias Mahlmann, Theorizing Transnational 
Law: Varieties of Transnational Law and the Universalistic Stance, 10 GERMAN L. J. 1325 
(2009); Matthias Mahlmann, Ethics, Law, and the Challenge of Cognitive Science, 8 
GERMAN L. J. 577 (2007); Greg Miller, The Roots of Morality, 320 SCIENCE 734 (2008); 
Shaun Nichols, Innateness and Moral Psychology, in THE INNATE MIND, VOL 1: 
STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS, supra at 353-69; Dennis Patterson, On the Conceptual and 
the Empirical: A Critique of John Mikhail’s Cognitivism, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1053 (2008); 
Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 13, 2008; Paul H. Robinson, 
Robert Kurzban, & Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. 
L. REV. 1633 (2007); Stephen Stich, Is Morality an Elegant Machine or a Kluge? 6 
JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND CULTURE 181 (2006).  
 35 See, e.g., ELLIOT TURIEL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: 
MORALITY AND CONVENTION (1983); Judith G. Smetana, Social Cognitive-Development: 
Domain Distinctions and Coordinations, 3 DEV. REV. 131 (1983). 
 36 See, e.g., Michael J. Chandler, Bryan W. Sokal & Cecilia Wainryb, Beliefs 
About Truth and Beliefs About Rightness, 71 CHILD DEV. 91 (2000); see also John Mikhail, 
The Poverty of the Moral Stimulus, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL 1: THE EVOLUTION OF 
MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS 353-59 (W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., 2008). 
 37 Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, & Marc Hauser, The Role of Conscious 
Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm, 17 
PSYCH. SCI. 1082 (2006). 
 38 See, e.g., Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe, The Neural Basis of Belief Encoding 
and Integration in Moral Judgment, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1912 (2008); Liane Young, Fiery A. 
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Furthermore, these comparative data also point to a 
variety of novel experimental protocols in anthropology, 
cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, and other 
disciplines that could shed further light on the moral grammar 
hypothesis. For example, our findings suggest that researchers 
in these fields would benefit from relying more directly on legal 
theory and actual legal cases to uncover the properties of the 
mental representations implicit in common moral intuitions and 
to describe their behavioral and neurological effects. Cases of 
mistake, ignorance, attempt, double effect, self-defense, 
necessity, negligence, proximate causation, and other familiar 
doctrines should be the bread and butter of cognitive scientists 
seeking to discover the structure of the moral mind, and these 
researchers should rely more heavily on the sophisticated 
theoretical vocabulary of the law to design and interpret the 
results of their experiments. All of these conclusions and the 
findings themselves should be approached cautiously, however, 
and considered in light of several important caveats and 
qualifications. In what follows, I briefly identify four such 
considerations, leaving a more comprehensive discussion of 
them for another occasion. 
First, it is important to clarify at the outset that the goal 
of our study is accurate description rather than prescription, 
justification, or some other normative objective. Even if it were 
true that all or most jurisdictions adopt one or another approach 
to homicide, this fact by itself would not thereby commend or 
justify that approach, nor is our present concern to address this 
or any other normative issue. 
Second, it seems equally important to emphasize that 
familiar problems of classification, interpretation, and 
terminology are serious and non-trivial in this context, as are 
the more general problems of bias and ethnocentrism. Does 
Western science, in this case Western jurisprudence, furnish 
abstract concepts that can be fruitfully used to describe and 
analyze social, legal, and mental phenomena in non-Western, 
tribal, or small-scale societies, or does any such cultural 
imposition lead inevitably to theoretical distortion and 
confusion? Legal anthropologists and other researchers have 
  
Cushman, Marc D. Hauser, & Rebecca Saxe, The Neural Basis of the Interaction Between 
Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment, 104 PROC. NAT ACAD. SCI 8235 (2007); see also 
Michael Koenigs, Liane Young, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Fiery Cushman, Marc 
Hauser, & Antonio Damasio, Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral 
Judgements, 446 NATURE 908 (2007).  
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debated these and related topics at great length;39 however, the 
issues remain unresolved, and the most plausible answers to 
these vexed questions fall beyond the scope of this Essay. For 
present purposes, I wish to avoid getting tangled in these 
familiar methodological debates, while at the same time clearly 
acknowledging their importance and the need to give them 
serious and sustained consideration. 
Third, one might justifiably raise several interrelated 
concerns about the specific codes and analytical criteria utilized 
in this study. For example, some of the codes seem clearly 
outdated, and others seem likely to have been revised or 
amended without our knowledge. Because of the large 
expenditure of time and effort it took to locate a code for each 
jurisdiction, it was not always possible to verify that its relevant 
provisions were currently in effect in that jurisdiction. It must be 
admitted, moreover, that the analytical criteria used thus far in 
our research are crude and stand in need of further refinement. 
As informed observers will recognize, many of the complexities 
that occupy serious criminal law theory have been ignored or 
deliberately pushed under the rug. So, too, there are countless 
interpretive problems having to do with language and linguistic 
diversity in a study like this, along with unavoidable pitfalls of 
translation. “A primary goal of comparative law is to become 
aware of the way in which language shapes legal culture,” 
Professor Fletcher observes, “and doing so requires an 
exploration of why some terms have a nearly universal meaning 
and others are culturally specific.”40 Thus far, our study falls well 
short of this exploration, and to that extent it seems clearly 
deficient.  
Finally, although a plausible argument can be made for 
the proposition that codified legal norms are a useful source of 
information from which to draw inferences about human 
psychology,41 one should approach this endeavor cautiously. 
Even with respect to the substantive criminal law, the number 
  
 39 For some valuable critical discussion of these issues, see, for example, Paul 
Bohannan, Ethnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology, in LAW IN CULTURE AND 
SOCIETY 401-18 (Laura Nader ed., 1997); Max Gluckman, Concepts in the Comparative 
Study of Tribal Law, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, supra, at 349-73; Laura Nader, 
Introduction, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, supra, at 1-10; see also BROWN, supra 
note 5, at ch. 1; Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of 
Culture, in CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS ch. 
1 (1973). 
 40 FLETCHER, GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 24, at 118. 
 41 See generally Miller, supra note 34; see also Mikhail, Moral Grammar and 
Intuitive Jurisprudence, supra note 34.  
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and variety of factors that determine the form and substance of 
such codes beggar the imagination. Evidently, the mind’s own 
hidden rules of moral judgment are merely one of many 
variables entering into this process. This complexity and the 
resulting idealization that any such endeavor necessarily 
assumes must be kept firmly in mind, particularly when one is 
considering the possibility of relating universal features of 
criminal law to features of human nature.42 
Despite these and other important qualifications, it 
seems clear that the provisional data presented in this Essay 
bear directly on the question of moral universals and mark a 
potentially significant turning point in our understanding of this 
topic. The theoretical insight provided by the detailed analysis of 
codified legal norms is real and substantial. Particularly when a 
codified prohibition appears to exist and operate throughout the 
world, this type of research serves to illustrate how the 
systematic investigation of a richly structured norm can advance 
the existing debate about moral universals beyond its ordinary 
parameters. As this research project continues to unfold, it 
seems likely that it will enable scientists to describe the mental 
rules and representations underlying human moral intuitions 
with much greater accuracy than has been heretofore possible. 
Furthermore, the apparent universality or near-universality of 
the homicide prohibition suggests, although it does not entail, 
that the moral grammar hypothesis is sound, thereby 
reinforcing the assumption that future research in moral 
psychology should build on this naturalistic foundation. 
  
 42 On the other hand, it is important to note that because many jurisdictions 
recognize particular defenses such as necessity, duress, and provocation through the 
development of case law rather than codification, relying exclusively on codified elements 
of the homicide prohibition may significantly understate the universality of these 
defenses. If one were to research the case law in these jurisdictions, one might discover 
that these defenses are recognized more frequently, perhaps even rivaling the data on 
criminalization, intent, self-defense, and insanity/mental illness. 
